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Environmental Audit Committee inquiry on ‘Environmental risks of fracking’ 
 
Executive summary 
1. This is a submission by the ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy 
and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at 
London School of Economics and Political Science and the Grantham Institute at 
Imperial College London. It focuses in particular on the implications of fracking 
for the UK’s  targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
2. This submission builds on the evidence collected in the course of the study ‘A UK 
‘dash’ for smart gas’ (Bassi et al., 2013) by the ESRC Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment , and Grantham Institute. 
3. The main points of this submission: 
 Shifting from coal to natural gas - either from conventional or unconventional 
domestic sources, or from imports - for electricity generation could help the 
UK power sector to decarbonise in the near term. Gas-fired power plants 
could also play an important back-up role as the share of renewable 
electricity in generation increases. 
 In the longer term, gas-fired power plants will have to be either replaced by 
low-carbon alternatives or fitted with carbon capture and storage (CCS) if the 
UK is to comply with its emission reduction targets. 
 A lower risk option would be a ‘dash’ for smart gas, where natural gas, 
including domestic shale gas, is used judiciously in those areas where it offers 
the greatest value in decarbonising the power sector, preventing the 
undesirable lock in of infrastructure for fossil fuels. 
 
The implications of fracking for the UK’s targets of reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions 
4. Natural gas, either domestic or imported, will continue to play an important role 
in the UK energy mix over the coming decades, for both heating and electricity 
generation. Shale gas could have a role to play, especially in terms of increased 
energy security. It is, however, unlikely to have the same dramatic effect in the 
UK as has occurred in the United States. 
5. There is great uncertainty about the actual size of UK shale gas reserves that 
would be commercially viable to extracted. The available evidence (EIA, 2011; 
Cuadrilla, 2011; ECC, 2012; Andrews, 2013 and 2014; Monaghan, 2014; DECC, 
2012) suggests that these reserves could, at best, make up for the decreasing size 
of conventional domestic resources as reservoirs are depleting. But shale gas is 
unlikely to expand domestic gas availability beyond current levels, let alone 
render the UK energy-independent and free from the need to import natural gas. 
6. Economic implications, particularly the future price of natural gas, will also affect 
the extent of fracking. Domestic shale gas reserves are likely to be too modest to 
affect gas market prices in the UK, which may remain largely driven by uncertain 
wholesale prices charged by foreign suppliers. A decrease in gas prices could 
have positive consequences for the UK economy, but could also affect the 
profitability of fracking, resulting in lower production. The potential of shale gas 
is worth investigating, to gain a better understanding of its actual availability in 
the UK. However, exploration and production will have to be subject to strict 
environmental standards, including at the wellhead to prevent fugitive emissions 
of methane, which is a powerful greenhouse gas. 
7. The production of shale gas can lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions than 
those released during the production of natural gas from conventional sources. 
This is because shale gas production involves a larger number of wells and more 
hydraulic fracturing operations, both of which require energy. And, importantly, 
shale gas operations lead to more venting of gas during well completion if they 
are not managed and regulated effectively (Hirst et al., 2013). There is evidence 
that shale gas development in the United States has led to significant fugitive 
emissions of methane (e.g. EPA, 2012; Howarth et al., 2011; Clark, 2011; Pétron, 
2012). Some analysts have concluded that these have been so great as to 
eliminate the lifecycle greenhouse gas emission benefits of shale gas compared 
with coal for power generation (e.g., Howarth et al, 2011), although this has been 
disputed (e.g. Clark et al, 2011). 
8. UK and European Union (EU) environmental regulation, however, can counteract 
the risk of high fugitive emissions. A recent analysis for the European 
Commission (AEA et al., 2012) found that lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions 
from shale gas production in the EU may be only slightly higher (4-8 percent) 
than those generated by the extraction of conventional gas. And if emissions 
from well completion are mitigated and utilised, the difference in emissions can 
be reduced to between 1 and 5 per cent. In such a case, lifecycle emissions from 
EU shale gas production can also be 2 to 10 per cent lower than emissions from 
electricity generated from conventional pipeline gas obtained from non-Member 
States, notably Russia and Algeria. Lifecycle emissions from power generation 
that is fuelled by shale gas are estimated to be also significantly lower (41 to 49 
per cent) than those generated by the burning of coal for electricity. 
9. The main issue is therefore not whether fracking would be compatible with the 
UK carbon budgets (to the extent that its potential may be modest, and 
emissions comparable to conventional gas), but rather whether the overall UK 
policy concerning gas - including conventional, unconventional and imported 
resources - is consistent with them. 
10. Meeting the economy-wide carbon budgets will require a gradual reshaping of 
the UK’s energy infrastructure. The power sector, in particular, will need to play a 
central role in meeting the budgets, since it is a major source of greenhouse gas 
emissions (about a quarter of total 2013 emissions; DECC, 2014) and it offers 
mitigation opportunities at the lowest potential cost (CCC, 2010). Furthermore, 
low-carbon electricity is assumed to provide the basis for the decarbonisation of 
other parts of the economy, such as surface transport, residential heating and 
perhaps parts of industry. 
11. In the short term, the UK’s emissions can be reduced by innovating in shale gas 
extraction and replacing coal-fired power stations with those fuelled by natural 
gas, especially if fugitive emissions are adequately controlled and gas 
development does not significantly reduce technological progress in low-carbon 
and renewable energy. According to provisional figures published by the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (2014), coal was responsible for 21.1 
per cent of the UK’s annual emissions of greenhouse gases in 2013. The use of 
natural gas without CCS technology should, however, be agreed to be on a time-
limited basis (Aghion et al, 2014). 
12. In the medium to long term, a heavy reliance on gas-fired power stations with 
unabated emissions would hinder the decarbonisation of the UK’s power sector. 
In such case, to be able to meet the overall fourth carbon budget, the additional 
emissions from the power sector would need to be offset by additional cuts in 
other sectors. Whether this would be economically sensible will depend on the 
future price of gas, which remains uncertain, as well as on the cost-effectiveness 
of alternative measures for emissions abatement in other sectors. Furthermore, 
some of the alternative mitigation measures may still be linked to 
decarbonisation of the power sector (for example, switching to electric cars and 
electric heating), so a higher level of carbon intensity for electricity generation 
could have further knock-on effects on their cost and feasibility. 
13. To alleviate concerns about the lock in of gas-based infrastructures, the 
Government would need to credibly signal to the private sector that gas (without 
CCS) will be not subject to a favourable regulatory environment in the medium 
term (i.e. from 2030; Helm, 2012). The private sector would then invest in gas 
capital assets (fields, power plants etc.) on the basis that they could make an 
economic return over the coming 15-year period, but no longer (Aghion et al., 
2014). 
14. The life of gas-fired power plants could be extended only if their emissions can 
be captured with CCS technology. If CCS is effective and implemented, then a 
sustained use of natural gas for electricity generation could well be consistent 
with carbon budgets after 2030. Further, research in fully clean technologies 
would need to be strongly stepped up over the intervening period, along with 
other supportive policies (Aghion et al., 2014). 
15. Investment in complementary technologies will therefore be essential. In 
particular, it will be crucial to find out as soon as possible whether gas-fired 
power stations fitted with CCS can become economically viable in the UK within 
the next decade or so. Strong UK Government support for research, development 
and deployment across a number of CCS pilot projects will be crucial to prove 
this technology is commercially viable, and to bring down costs (Imperial College 
London, 2011). The Member States of the EU should also coordinate their CCS 
efforts and push ahead with pilot schemes, including the development of CCS 
technology that can be retrofitted to power stations (Bassi et al., forthcoming). 
16. A mandatory decarbonisation target for the power sector in 2030, as required by 
the UK Energy Act 2013, could also help to ensure that enough investment is 
made in low-carbon electricity generation, by reducing policy uncertainty. This 
can also encourage ‘smart’ investment in fracking and gas-fired power stations to 
a level which is consistent with the carbon budgets and preventing infrastructure 
lock in. 
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